This paper describes an integrated assessment model with an unknown temperature threshold where severe and irreversible climate impacts, called a tipping point, occurs. The possibility of tipping leads to the following linked outcomes: a prolonged period of peak temperature; a rebound in emissions prior to and during peak temperature; and a fall in the optimal carbon tax as a ratio of output prior to and during peak temperature. Although tipping can occur in any period where temperature rises to a new maximum, the optimal carbon price can be calculated from future temperature outcomes conditional on no tipping. Learning that tipping has not occurred lowers the tax.
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The optimal carbon tax with an endogenous chance of a tipping climate By ANTHONY WISKICH* This paper describes an integrated assessment model with an unknown temperature threshold where severe and irreversible climate impacts, called a tipping point, occurs. The possibility of tipping leads to the following linked outcomes: a prolonged period of peak temperature; a rebound in emissions prior to and during peak temperature; and a fall in the optimal carbon tax as a ratio of output prior to and during peak temperature. Although tipping can occur in any period where temperature rises to a new maximum, the optimal carbon price can be calculated from future temperature outcomes conditional on no tipping. Learning that tipping has not occurred lowers the tax. (JEL H23, O44, Q30, Q40, Q54, Q56, Q58) Keywords: Climate change, tipping points, optimal policy, optimal taxes. International agreements have committed nations to limit global warming to 2 degrees Celsius ( O C). Specifying a temperature limit seems a reasonable approach in the presence of considerable uncertainty of climate impacts 1 , particularly as risks 1 A recent review of the subject highlights criticism of Integrated Assessment Models and discusses the merits of using models that incorporate uncertainty (Farmer, Hepburn, Mealy, & Teytelboym, 2015) . are thought to increase with temperature. Tipping points can capture this risk: a tipping point in this paper is defined as an irreversible, permanent switch to a climate state with a higher sensitivity to temperature. It may therefore seem natural that optimal policy would look quite different before and after peak temperature in a model with uncertain climate impacts.
In contrast, the integrated assessment model described by Golosov, Hassler, Krusell, and Tsyvinski (2014) , hereafter GHKT, implies that the optimal tax is not a function of temperature at all. In this framework, the climate sensitivity parameter is uncertain and the optimal carbon tax is constant as a proportion of output, depending only on the discount rate, the expected damage elasticity and the structure of carbon depreciation in the atmosphere. Stochastic values of future output, consumption, emissions concentration, technology growth, and population do not influence the optimal tax rate. Various extensions of this benchmark model have already been made. 2 The current paper builds on the GHKT framework and introduces a tipping point, which creates an endogenous link between peak temperature and optimal policy. The current paper adopts tipping characteristics similar to those described in D. Lemoine and Traeger (2014) , hereafter LT: each threshold temperature increase may trigger a tipping point with equal probability; there exists a trigger point between the current temperature and an upper bound; and both Bayesian learning and non-learning scenarios are considered. The probability of tipping in a period is referred to as the hazard rate. Whereas LT and other papers that consider endogenous tipping build on the DICE model (Nordhaus, 2008) , this paper builds on the GHKT model, allowing investigation of technology growth and energy substitutability in the optimal policy choice, and simplifying analysis and computation as described below.
The existence of a tipping point increases the carbon price in two ways. First, expected damages rise from a given temperature increase. This effect dominates the literature and is the only effect considered in deterministic studies, or when the hazard rate is exogenous as considered by Gerlagh and Liski (2018) in a similar analytical climate-economy model. Second, the endogeneity of the hazard rate raises the tax, as described by Van der Ploeg (2014) in a partial equilibrium framework. Numerical exercises have found that an endogenous hazard rate can significantly boost today's optimal carbon price. 3 This paper also finds this result.
In addition to increasing today's carbon price, the endogenous hazard rate changes the profile of the tax. Other studies have found an optimal tax to income ratio that varies, including some that consider tipping points 4 and others that do not. 5 While the current paper finds that learning lowers the tax in the absence of a tipping event, the tax ratio can increase or decrease initially depending on parameter settings. However, the dominant and novel quantitative outcome of the current paper relates to the prolonged stabilization of peak temperature. This paper is the first to show that, taking into account climate inertia, a declining optimal carbon price can lead to prolonged stabilisation at peak temperature and a rebound in emissions. 6 Such behaviour is similar to the emissions overshooting 3 Lontzek, Cai, Judd, and Lenton (2015) include an endogenous hazard rate in the DICE model with a phased impact from tipping. They find today's optimal carbon price is increased by around 50 to 200 percent, depending on the probability and severity of tipping. LT find a tipping point increases the near-term optimal carbon price by between 25 and 40 percent, with a small component due to endogeneity. In a later paper, they include multiple tipping points in a stochastic dynamic version of the DICE model and find this nearly doubles today's optimal carbon tax (D. Lemoine & Traeger, 2016) .
4 Gerlagh and Liski (2018) find that the tax ratio can increase without learning and decrease if learning occurs, although in their quantitative exercise this is not material before 2100. Lontzek et al. (2015) find a decreasing ratio, LT find an increasing ratio and a roughly constant ratio in their more recent paper D. Lemoine and Traeger (2016) . 5 Literature includes Rezai and Van Der Ploeg (2017) , Ploeg and Withagen (2014) , Jensen and Traeger (2014) and D. Lemoine (2017) . 6 D. M. Lemoine and Traeger (2012) also report optimal policy that keeps the temperature constant over most of the next century, but only when inertia in the climate system is not considered. described in D. Lemoine and Rudik (2017) , where the emissions path minimises costs with a temperature limit. Thus, although a cost-benefit framework is used in this paper, the results using this approach share some similar characteristics with a cost-minimisation framework due to the combination of an endogenous hazard rate and the severe damages in a post-tipping world. I explore further in Wiskich (2019b).
This paper also makes some methodological contributions related to the inclusion of a tipping point with an endogenous hazard rate into the GHKT model, rather than the DICE model. Optimal tax equations are explicitly derived, making the impact of endogeneity transparent, and computation is straight forward as the optimal carbon price can be calculated with temperature outcomes conditional on tipping not occurring. Thus, although the introduction of endogenous tipping means the optimal tax becomes dependent on expectations of temperature outcomes and so is more complex than the simple form discussed in GHKT, computation is still straight forward as only one future outcome is needed to derive the tax. 7 Learning is shown to reduce growth in the optimal carbon tax, and for a distant peak temperature, the carbon tax will grow in the absence of learning while it may either grow or shrink with learning depending on the concavity of the no-tipping temperature profile.
I. Model
The model modifies the completely characterised model described in GHKT. A global representative household has logarithmic preferences over consumption with discount rate β, and thus maximises the following:
7 The extraction of oil is solved intertemporally, but the Cobb-Douglas form adopted in this paper implies this dynamic can also be solved with only the no-tipping outcome.
Damages are an exponential function of temperature, as used by Gerlagh and Liski (2018) , rather than emissions concentration as in GHKT. There is considerable uncertainty around the form of the damages function, but an exponential function of temperature is consistent with some recent evidence (Burke, Hsiang, & Miguel, 2015) . Final output is a Cobb-Douglas specification of capital , sector ' labour , oil and other energy and a multiplicative exponential damage function of atmospheric temperature above pre-industrial, as follows:
Oil has been separated from other energy (coal and clean) so that a lower elasticity of substitution can be applied, reflecting evidence of high substitutability between clean and dirty inputs in electricity (Wiskich, 2019a) . The Cobb Douglas formulation also leads to easier computation under uncertainty as described below.
Climate dynamics for carbon and methane are taken from Shine, Fuglestvedt, Hailemariam, and Stuber (2005) and account for climate-system inertia.
Temperature dynamics are a function of radiative forcing :
where is the heat capacity of the system and is a climate sensitivity parameter. Oil prices follow a hotelling rule corrected for the carbon tax to GDP ratio
Coal and renewable prices are set by wages in sector ' as follows:
Tipping point, damages and scenarios
To implement the concept of a tipping point, I use a probability distribution for the tipping point threshold's location that is uniform in temperature, as used by LT.
I assume that the tipping point has not been reached to date and hence lies between the initial temperature and an upper limit , set at 6 O C warming. 8 The temperature sensitivity of the damages parameter in (2) damages as a function of temperature are shown in Figure 2 . The formulation of the damage function lies below the GHKT damage function for low warming, but then increases more rapidly as the probability of tipping increases. The damage at high temperatures is much greater than DICE-2007, but less than damage functions used in other papers. 9
In this paper, climate sensitivity in the severe regime after tipping is high relative to the moderate regime. For comparison, LT represent a climate feedback tipping point as increasing climate sensitivity to 4 O C, 5 O C or 6 O C rather than the standard assumption of 3 O C. As damages are assumed to increase with the square of temperature increase, the triggering of the tipping point in the LT framework therefore increases damages by either 80%, 180% or 300%. In contrast, the tipping point from the severe sensitivity in this paper corresponds to over a 30-fold increase in damages. 
II. Optimal tax
The Lagrangian maximizes (1) subject to production and temperature constraints as follows:
The optimal condition describing the marginal costs and benefits of producing a unit of energy of type i, in terms of final consumption good at time t, is
The costs in (15.1) include the cost of input use , the scarcity cost , and the marginal externality damage. This last cost is the optimal Pigouvian tax ( ) and
from (15.2) and (2) is as follows:
In the GHKT model is constant, leading to a constant tax (to output) ratio .
Gerlagh and Liski (2018) consider an exogenous , so the tax ratio is predetermined and independent of temperature outcomes. By assuming an endogenous link between the hazard rate and temperature, the tax ratio in this paper is a function of expected temperature outcomes. In the event of tipping in the Learning scenario, the damage parameter is the constant and therefore the tax ratio after tipping is constant. The expected derivative in (16.2) is
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Following from lemma 1, this expression can be calculated from future temperatures conditional on no tipping. However, oil extraction is a function of expectations as (10) describes. The expectation term in (10), , is
given by
As the tipping tax ratio is constant, is determined by the following:
Although (19) is not amenable to an analytical solution, it is self-contained leading to the following lemma.
LEMMA 2: Oil use does not depend on temperature outcomes if tipping occurs.
The combination of lemmas 1 and 2 lead to the following key result.
PROPOSITION 1: The optimal tax ratio can be calculated by temperature outcomes conditional on no tipping only: outcomes where tipping occurs are not needed.
Thus, although tipping can happen at any period prior to peak temperature, the optimal tax can be determined by a single future outcome where tipping does not occur. This result follows from the form of the damages function coupled with key assumptions made in the GHKT model that lead to a constant tax ratio: logarithmic utility, a multiplicative exponential damage function of temperature which is a 14 linear function of energy use, and constant savings rates. 10 Computation is consequently much simpler, as the tax profile can be determined by one future outcome rather than having to handle all possible outcomes as previous studies have done. 11 Proposition 1 would also hold for other tipping point constructs, such as a within-period hazard rate that is a function of current temperature only, as used by Gerlagh and Liski (2018) . 12
The first component of (17), , is the tax that would apply given an exogenous probability profile corresponding to the no-tipping temperature outcomes for the scenario. 13 The second component is due to the endogeneity of the hazard rate and is equal to For all scenarios considered in the numerical exercises except Laissez faire, peak temperature starts prior to 2300. A computationally challenging feature of (20) is the discontinuity in the derivative of the probability of tipping. To handle this discontinuity, a time of onset of peak temperature ( ) is imposed with constraints ensuring temperature after period does not exceed :
. Equation (15.1) becomes and the tax becomes
The multiplier is adjusted by the constant consumption rate. If tipping has not occurred, taxes following peak temperature are set so that temperature does not exceed and these peak temperature taxes are equal to:
The multipliers are derived from the (numerically determined) taxes needed to stabilize temperature: the tax in the period prior to the end of peak temp is given by which gives , the tax in the prior period is which then gives and so on. The choice of is determined through manual iteration: for a high , peak temperature occurs prior to this value, and thus the value of is manually reduced until it corresponds with peak temperature. Any further reduction in implies the tax in this period is higher than would be the case without the upper limit constraint applying (holding the tax in all other periods constant), implying suboptimality.
The main scenario assumes the hazard rate is a linear function of temperature, consistent with damages. Convex functions could also be modelled as in Van der Ploeg (2014) . An advantage of the analytical expression (17) is that it is clear how the slope of the hazard rate with respect to temperature, , enters the tax 16 equation. In the numerical examples in the next section, the endogenous tax component dominates. Therefore, a quadratic function with a much lower initial slope should greatly reduce the optimal tax, and this is confirmed with a sensitivity in the next section.
The effects of learning
To understand what drives changes in the tax ratio initially, consider a prolonged period of peak temperature and small temperature changes relative to the upper limit such that the probability of tipping is small, . Ignoring the multipliers in (21), and using (12) (17) and (20), the tax ratio prior to peak temperature is approximately given by:
The absolute growth in initial tax ratios for each scenario and are then
The first term is positive and increases with the growth in temperature prior to the peak. The second term is negative and increases with the proximity of peak temperature. Thus, if peak temperature is low and occurs soon, the tax ratios will fall in both learning and non-learning scenarios, as demonstrated in the numerical examples in this paper. However, for a distant peak temperature, the tax ratio will grow if there is no learning and may grow or shrink with learning, depending on the third term. This third term implies growth in the Learning scenario is lower than the No learning scenario.
PROPOSITION 2: For temperatures well below the upper bound, learning that tipping has not occurred reduces growth in the optimal carbon tax.
The condition that the temperature is well below the upper bound is needed because, if tipping has not occurred, the optimal tax approaches infinity as the temperature approaches the upper bound. This follows due to the certain existence of a threshold below the upper bound and should be considered merely as an artefact of this modelling assumption. While an interesting implication is that the tax can rise above the optimal post-tipping tax if tipping has not occurred, this behaviour is not explored in the numerical examples.
Consider a distant peak temperature ( approaches infinity) where for all and constant temperature response , then the change in tax rates can be approximated by:
Thus for , the tax ratio for Learning will grow at roughly half the rate of No learning, while for a highly concave steady-state emissions profile ( ) the
Learning tax ratio will shrink.
REMARK 1: Consider a distant peak temperature ( approaches infinity) and slowly growing temperature. The No learning tax will grow initially while growth in the Learning tax depends on the concavity of temperature profile. For an almost linear temperature profile, the Learning tax will grow at roughly half the rate of the No learning tax.
Catastrophic damages
Recent literature has suggested that climate policy is highly sensitive to 'fattailed' risks of catastrophic outcomes (Weitzman, 2009) . As noted in the previous section, the framework used in this paper considers a known high climate sensitivity in the severe regime after tipping. Consider that the severe climate sensitivity is unknown and moderate damages are zero, and the tipping framework is as already described. Uncertainty of is independent of uncertainty related to the future probability of a tipping event. The economic framework used in this paper does not exhibit sensitivity to fat-tailed risks, as the key term in the optimal tax equation (17) is simply a function of the expectation of as follows: 14
Now consider a finite probability of infinite climate sensitivity . If the probability of tipping is non-zero, equation (26) indicates that the tax ratio will also be infinite, as will the tax level. 15 Due to the climate model and tipping framework, the probability of tipping is zero in the Learning scenario if the onset of peak temperature has occurred, and thus the tax will be finite.
Consider that an infinite tax in period leads to zero fossil energy use in that period. The temperature may rise or fall in a period with zero emissions, depending on the profile of historical emissions according to (6) . For the parameter settings in this paper, the initial temperature rises in 2020 even if energy use is zero due to the recent ramp up in emissions, implying an infinite tax if there is a finite probability of infinite damages. However, for later periods the temperature would fall as the temperature response from an emissions pulse drops after two decades, as shown in Figure 1 . Thus from 2030 the optimal tax will be finite as the hazard rate becomes zero. More formally, from (6) a decreasing temperature, leads to the following remark as REMARK 2: If the expected damages from tipping are infinite but tipping has not yet occurred, the optimal tax in period is finite if:
Under a No learning scenario, the hazard rate becomes finite permanently if the temperature rises above the starting point, which occurs in 2020 even if energy use is zero as discussed above. Hence the tax will always be infinite in this scenario if 15 To consider the behaviour of the tax level as the tax ratio approaches infinity, note that the energy composite approaches a finite value if the elasticity of substitution is greater than 1: if . Assuming an infinite tax level and constant oil extraction in (10) leads to zero oil extraction and . Thus output approaches zero with and the tax level also approaches infinity if the probability of tipping is non-zero. 20 the expected damages from tipping are infinite. In the next section, the effects of catastrophic damages are further explored by choosing extreme climate sensitivity in a post-tipping world. Table 1 shows parameters for the main simulation, taken from GHKT and Shine et al. (2005) . Historical emissions go back a century and induce initial warming at 2020 of 1.11 0 C, aligning with the centre of the range of IPCC estimates (IPCC, 2014) . Initial decadal global GDP is set to $800 trillion. Key differences in parameter choices between this paper and GHKT are the elasticity of substitution and assumed growth in coal technology. This paper assumes a higher elasticity of 2, which GHKT consider as a sensitivity, and reduced growth in coal technology, reflecting the relative maturity of dirty technology. 16 As sensitivities, I investigate coal productivity growth at 2 percent as in GHKT, a lower elasticity of substitution between coal and clean of 1.5, a quadratic probability in temperature, and catastrophic damages under tipping.
III. Numerical examples
Due to the separation of oil and other energy, some parameters are recalibrated as follows. Using initial values of energy inputs from GHKT , and the ratio of renewable to coal is and the ratio of the oil to coal price is 16 Coal technology grows at 1% per annum while clean technology grows at 2 percent per annum.
17 These values in GtC/yr are 3.43, 3.75 and 2.3 respectively. Ef(-10:-1) Period 0 [10,10,10,20,30,40,50,60,80, 
Main simulation
As shown in Panel A of Figure 3 , the Learning tax ratio starts at about the same level as No learning but falls faster, consistent with proposition 2. Ratios in both scenarios drop until the end of peak temperature (panel G) and real taxes flatten (panel B) coinciding with peak temperature. Following peak temperature, the tax grows with income. Today's expected tax ratio in the Learning scenario is also shown, which ends up marginally higher than the No learning tax ratio.
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Endogeneity of the hazard rate makes up the majority of the optimal tax (panels C and D While GHKT find that coal -rather than oil -is the main threat to economic welfare, panel F indicates that oil dominates over coal for contribution to peak temperature. Amongst other assumptions, this result depends on the substitutability of energy and technology growth, discussed in the next section as sensitivities.
Sensitivities Figure 4 shows the results from various sensitivities. The first row shows results when coal technology grows by 2 percent per annum, in line with clean technology.
The second reduces the elasticity between coal and clean energy to 1.5. The third shows results when the probability of tipping is quadratic in temperature change, so that in equation (12). The fourth shows catastrophic damages where is increased by a factor of 10 so that damages reach 30 percent at 2 O C warming. Stabilisation of peak temperature occurs in all sensitivities.
As the technology growth rates for coal and clean energy are the same in the first sensitivity, the marginal cost of abatement is flat after oil is depleted. This contrasts with the main simulation where the marginal cost of abatement declines exogenously, and in previous studies using the DICE model. The comparable temperature outcomes between the first sensitivity and the main result indicate that the tax is dominant in determining energy inputs, rather than productivity growth.
As one would expect, outcomes are highly sensitive to the elasticity of substitution between coal and clean inputs. A reduction in elasticity to 1.5 increases temperature outcomes and the tax. Changing the slope of the hazard rate in the third sensitivity eliminates most of the endogenous component of the tax. Catastrophic damages lead to very high taxes and a peak temperature in 2030. The drop in the tax is sufficient to dominate the discount rate in the hotelling formula for oil extraction (10), leading to peak oil use in 2030 rather than 2020. 
FIGURE 4 RESULTS FOR THE SENSITIVITIES

III. Conclusion
This paper examines optimal policy where there is an unknown temperature threshold of severe and irreversible climate tipping. Most of the initial carbon price id due to the endogeneity of the probability of tipping, so using an exogenous probability of tipping may materially underestimate the starting optimal tax rate.
The tax ratio drops prior to and during peak temperature, leading to a prolonged stabilisation at peak temperature and a rebound in emissions.
A decline in the optimal tax ratio merits greater awareness not only for the implications for temperature and emissions outcomes, but also for the potential effect on public perceptions of a carbon price. Such a decline may alleviate public resistance to a carbon price due to the temporary nature of high tax levels. In addition, temperature stabilisation resulting from the decline conceptually links the 27 political strategy of setting temperature targets with an optimal tax from an integrated assessment framework.
For temperatures well below the upper bound, learning reduces growth in the optimal tax ratio. The initial tax ratio can grow or shrink depending on parameter choices. If peak temperature is low and occurs soon, the tax ratios will fall in both learning and non-learning scenarios, as demonstrated in the numerical examples in this paper. However, for a distant peak temperature, the tax ratio will grow if there is no learning and may grow or shrink with learning, depending on the concavity of temperature profile. For a linearly increasing temperature profile, the growth in tax ratio with learning will be roughly half of the scenario without learning.
Without the risk of tipping, or if tipping has already occured, the optimal carbon tax is constant as a ratio of output and independent of expected temperature. When there is a chance of tipping, the optimal carbon tax becomes a function of future temperature, which is sensitive to the structure of energy and technology growth.
However, due to the structure of the model, only future temperature outcomes without tipping need to be considered in deriving the tax ratio. This makes consideration of tipping points easy to incorporate compared with the DICE model, as used by previous studies.
Along with this relative advantage, the model used in this paper allows investigation of energy technology growth and energy substitutability on the optimal policy choice. The derived explicit tax equations provide general insights which future studies can build on and apply. For example, in another paper I use these equations to derive the optimal weights between methane and carbon due to different decay profiles (Wiskich, 2019b) .
